To a real if limited degree, the present and future health of populations depends on pharmaceutical innovation. In a much more immediate sense, the health of pharmaceutical corporations depends on a¯ow of new drugs. The evidence suggests that, despite apparent optimism, pharmaceutical innovation is failing. Why should this be happening?
The main issue is that, in order to sustain average industry growth, a company has to introduce each year one new product which will sell around £300 million per year for every 1±1.5% it has of the world pharmaceutical market. The industry as a whole needs about 70±100 new products per year of this size, or a larger number of smaller products or a smaller number of larger ones. A company the size of the newly merged GlaxoWellcome/SmithKline Beecham needs 3±7 products ever year, while one the size of AstraZeneca needs 2±4 products every year.
The problem is that research productivity is failing. None of the major companies is close to hitting the target. Total worldwide new chemical entities launched every year have fallen from 80±100 per year in the 1960s to 50±60 per year in the early 1980s and 30±40 per year in the late 1990s. As companies have become larger, internally generated molecules, as a proportion of marketed molecules, have fallen from about 4 of 5 in the 1960s to about 1 of 2 in the 1990s and as low as 1 of 5 in some wellknown companies. The reaction has been`the urge to merge', with even giants such as GlaxoWellcome and P®zer claiming they are too small. Almost always the public justi®cation given for such merger activity is the need for a larger research budget to sustain innovation. The reality is that the urge is driven by a failure to innovate at the required rate. Yet, since most of the evidence indicates that the larger is the R&D budget, the lower is the productivity per £100 million spent, the likely outcome of such mergers is innovation failure and the need to merge yet again to cover up the disaster.
Common responses of industry
A near-universal response to the problem among the pharmaceutical majors has been to`streamline' and tò commercialize' the process of research. These companies now usually have a policy of not investing in any drug where market research indicates future sales of less than about £300 million per year. The paradox is that most drugs which are predicted to sell at this level do not do so, because all the companies are following similar market research and there is intense competition in these areas. A few drugs in these favoured ®elds will do well, but no longer is there room for 20 1 .
Another paradox is that, in the past, market research almost always failed to identify the true blockbusters. Betablockers, H 2 antagonists, ACE-inhibitors and SSRI antidepressants were all close to being killed early in their career by market research. Ivan O È stholm has given a wonderful description of the development of what for a while was the world's top-selling drug, omeprazole (Losec) 2 . When the project that led to Losec was initiated in the late 1950s, market research was against it because antacids were abundant, sales rarely exceeded £1 million per year, and even a successful drug would not be pro®table in such a small market. In 1970, the Astra Science Advisory Board terminated the project on both scienti®c and commercial grounds. The research programme was kept going by stealth only by external Swedish Government grants. In 1980 Abbott terminated a research collaboration with Astra on the grounds that US sales of the product would never exceed $15 million per year. In the 1990s US sales reached $2 billion per year.
To their credit, the very top managers of the industry have rarely believed their own external propaganda concerning the success of their internal research. They have been conscious that old-fashioned drug discovery based on medicinal chemistry and animal pharmacology was too dependent on either an inef®cient trench-warfare type of slog or on the unpredictable emergence of seemingly capricious geniuses like James Black, Paul Janssen, Daniel Bovet, Gertrude Elion or Gerald Hitchings. But in their uncertainty and lack of self-con®dence the top managers have fallen for every new high-tech unproven wizardry making extravagant promises. They have invested billions before there has been any evidence at all that the techniques will be successful. At the same time they have abandoned the combination of massed infantry and eccentric genius which, inef®cient though it might have seemed, has served the industry well.
Three drug-discovery fads have driven the industry's R&D programmes in the past twenty yearsÐcomputeraided drug design (CADD), combinational chemistry linked to high throughput screening (CC/HTS) and genomics. There is no evidence that any of these is or will be capable of replacing the old techniques. The people using the techniques, and the people authorizing the funding for their introduction, seem to have lost all sense of biology and of the complexity of living things.
The reality of the new techniques
Only a handful of new drugs have truly originated from CADD. At a 1999 conference attended by representatives of all the world's top-20 pharmaceutical companies it was admitted that no company had obtained a single useful lead from CC/HTS 3 . There is no evidence of any new products for major diseases from genomics research getting even close to clinical trials. Loftus, head of research information management at Merck, Sharp and Dohme, has wondered aloud whether we might be making bigger haystacks as opposed to ®nding more needles 4 .
The merger activity is a clear sign that R&D is failing. Why should this be when so many clever people are throwing so much money at it? The answers fall into the broad categories of management on the one hand and understanding of biomedical science on the other.
The management issues relate to the fact that, despite all the guru-speak, discovery is an individual and not a team effort. Large corporations are inimical to creative genius and have in place elaborate structures to stop it. No one is better placed to comment on this than Ju Èrgen Drews, until recently group research director at Roche. In a recent book he has set out the issues clearly 5 . The¯avour of what he is saying can be sensed by a few quotes:
Creative individuals are being driven out of the industry and being replaced by functionaries who parrot strategic maxims . . . Research is being driven by lawyers, ®nancial experts, salesmen and market strategists who are completely unable to develop new ideas . . . It is doubtful whether there are any senior executives who understand the problem'.
The problems with CADD and CC/HTS
Most drugs interact with proteins. The central issue is that quaternary protein structure is profoundly complex. Some people have begun to understand this and at the end of 1999 IBM authorized its largest R&D project ever, the development of a machine ®ve hundred times more powerful than the largest current supercomputer 6 . The purpose is to elucidate protein folding and quaternary protein structure. The project is a recognition of how far we are from true understanding.
But even this project may not be enough. Research programmes directed at protein structure all work with proteins as crystals or proteins in aqueous solution. But that is not how most proteins are found in the body. Most proteins in vivo are embedded in or attached to lipid membranes. Even very small changes in the lipid environment can produce changes in the quaternary protein structure and large changes in protein function. Witt and Neilsen, at the Royal Danish School of Pharmacy, have demonstrated just how large the changes in protein function can be in response to seemingly trivial alterations in the lipid environment 7 . When the IBM project was announced, Barton, from the European Bioinformatics Institute in Cambridge, expressed doubts about the success because we simply do not know enough about the real solvent environments of most proteins (quoted in Ref. 6) . Given the problems with protein structure, it is therefore not surprising that CADD has failed to generate the expected success. It is perhaps signi®cant that the few CADD successes have tended to relate to viral proteins which are not normally in a lipid environment. Equally it is not surprising that CC linked to HTS has been less than stellar in its output. The protein targets in HTS assays are usually in an aqueous or ®xed-bed acellular environment, or in transfected cells. It is unlikely that the protein con®guration in such an assay system is exactly the same as that of the natural protein in vivo. As a consequence, most HTS`hits' may actually be irrelevant, whereas many potentially relevant molecules may be missed. Again paradoxically, it is possible that`crude' whole animal or animal organ systems may have been successful for drug screening because the proteins actually were in the normal in-vivo con®guration.
Genomics
It is not possible today to pick up a general medical journal or to open a newspaper (particularly the ®nancial papers) without ®nding someone waxing enthusiastic about the future successes of genomics in transforming our livesÐand in transforming the ®nancial health of this or that company. My own sense is that these predictions are based on a fundamental failure to understand biological complexity. There may eventually be a therapeutic revolution based on genomics, but it is likely to be a long way away.
The theory makes perfect sense. We identify the gene involved in a disease; we identify the proteins associated with that gene; on the basis of understanding protein structure and function we develop a drug which will correct or bypass the malfunctioning protein (or alternatively we develop a gene therapy technique to replace the faulty gene). The theory is wonderful but the practice has been almost total failure. The structure of sickle cell haemoglobin has been known for over forty years and for over a decade we think we have understood what is wrong in cystic ®brosis and muscular dystrophy. There has been no genomic or protein-based improvement in clinical management in any of these conditions. There is a tendency to believe that the failure is merely technical, that the problem is soluble but we just have not got the right technical plan. The river can be crossed: it is just a question of designing the right bridge. My hunch, however, is that the problem is more a philosophical one. The bridge may not be capable of being built, at least by any of the techniques that anyone is now proposing.
If the pharmaceutical industry is to make a commercial success of genomics, the technique must be successfully applied to common diseases such as diabetes, arthritis, depression, schizophrenia or cancer. But all these are multiple-gene diseases. If we cannot ®nd solutions to singlegene diseases, which are all relatively or absolutely rare and of little interest to major corporations, then there is no prospect at all of clinical success and therefore of commercial success with the common diseases. We need to understand the issues with the single-gene diseases before we have any hope of tackling the complex ones.
The issues are threefold. First, almost all single-gene diseases are due to loss of function and not to gain of function of a protein. It is unlikely that common diseases will be any different. Second, most single-gene diseases are turning out to be very complex in the sense that there may be several hundred different genetic abnormalities in the same protein, each producing a somewhat different proteinfolding and function defect. The abnormalities may all be in the same gene but the complexity is immense and a single therapeutic approach is unlikely to be applicable in all patients. Third, the issues in gene therapy are proving much more dif®cult than we imagined. It is still possible to imagine successful gene therapy for a single-gene disease. It is almost inconceivable for a multiple-gene disease, and certainly not within the commercial lifetime of any of today's giant pharmaceutical companies.
But let us suspend rational judgment for a moment and assume that the human genomics programme will lead to therapeutic success. The implications of a successful genomics programme are only marginally less devastating to the current pharmaceutical industry than would be a total failure of that programme. The reason for this is that common diseases will no longer be common. If a disease such as cystic ®brosis, due to a single gene, is now seen to be made up of hundreds of different speci®c genetic abnormalities the likelihood is that multiple-gene disorders will actually consist of hundreds or thousands of subdisorders, each with a requirement for a speci®c and different genomics-based approach. The pharmaceutical market as we know it will cease to exist. There will be no common diseases, market sizes will become dramatically smaller, and almost all therapies will have to become multiple since a single drug will not correct the disorder in any individual patient. The changes required of the industryÐand also of government regulatorsÐwill be profound. Because the markets for each speci®c therapy will be small, major companies will have to market thousands of products, perhaps few of them with worldwide sales of more than £50 million. Drug development costs will therefore have to become much lower if new products are to emerge and this will require a big change in the regulatory climate. Much of the bureaucracy of drug development, both in companies and in government, will have to disappear. Combination products will have to be welcomed and the present industry and regulator antagonism to them will have to go.
But this all depends on the success of the genomicsbased therapeutic programme. Neither industry executives nor government regulators should lose much sleep: failure is a much more likely outcome. One of the major obstacles to genomics is the dif®culty of developing agonist drugs.
Loss of function, gain of function: agonists and antagonists
What we know of single-gene diseases suggests that most genetic faults in the common diseases of interest to the pharmaceutical industry, and to most doctors, will be lossof-function rather than gain-of-function disorders. But the great majority of drugs already on the market involve inhibition of gain of function. Very few drugs are agonists and produce a gain of function. There must be a reason for this 8, 9 .
The few gain-of-function drugs fall into a limited number of categories. They may have short-term effects (oxytocin and prostaglandins), they may essentially be topical (dermatologicals and inhaled anti-asthmatics), they may imitate natural hormones that have long half-lives, originate in one organ, circulate in the blood and act on other organs (oestrogen, thyroid hormones, erythropoietin) or they may amplify the actions of natural agonists (SSRIs, cholinesterase inhibitors). Attempts to develop agonists for chronic illnesses which fall outside these categories have almost all failed.
The reasons are clear. The great majority of natural agonists require three components if they are to exert desirable biological effects without major side-effects: there must be a good ®t between the agonist and the protein binding site; there must be precise regulation of the timing of the rise and fall of concentration of the agonist; and the agonist must have a very restricted geographical distribution in the body. The distribution issue is important because many agonists are found in many different tissues. They exert speci®c and different effects in each tissue but can do so only because their metabolism restricts their distribution to that tissue.
A successful antagonist drug biases and damps down the existing system while leaving all three aspects of natural agonist action intact. The requirements of an agonist are much more complex. There must be a good ®t with the protein target but there must also be the right rates of rise and fall of the agonist at the target site and the anatomical distribution must be strictly limited. The second and third conditions are almost impossible to achieve, and the possible outcomes are a failure of effect, an effect quite different from that expected or intolerable side-effects because the agonist is working in too many places. It is not surprising that, while agonist drugs may seem wonderful ideas, few actually make it to the market 8 .
There is likely, therefore, to be a major mismatch between the drug needs which are identi®ed by genomics and the ability of the industry to supply those needs.
Do we need genomics for common diseases? Lessons from identical twins
We already know a great deal about the genetics of common diseases, in part from study of identical twins. And the most important single conclusion from the twin studies is so banal that its implications have largely been overlooked. This is that with common diseases the concordance rates in identical twins are usually in the range of 20±50%. Most people with a genome which predisposes them to develop a common disease do not develop that disease. Most of us are unwittingly practising genomic therapy. We have the genes but we are not suffering from the disease.
The conclusion is that simple environmental factors, many perhaps related to nutrition, some to other aspects of environment and lifestyle, are switching off the adverse effects of the genome in most people currently carrying disease-related genomes. We do not need any very sophisticated pharmaceuticals to perform the trick. What we do need to know is what are the environmental factors that are protecting us so successfully. And that comes down to careful clinical research.
The likelihood is that most common diseases will be soluble and even that the solutions will be accelerated by better understanding of genomics. But I do not think that many of the solutions will be of interest to the pharmaceutical industry unless it changes its approaches. The probable outcome is a much better understanding of human biochemistry, and the therapeutic products which are developed are likely to fall into three categories. Some will be co-factors for steps in human metabolism which are impaired but can be boosted by above-normal levels of co-factors. Some will be intermediates which are normal substances present in the human body but whose formation is impaired by some loss of function of a protein. Some will be lipids which will modify protein structure by changing the lipid environment in which the protein is embedded, so enabling it to function better.
These approaches are much closer to reality than genomics, as can be illustrated by examples. Hundreds of substances which are believed to work by increasing the synaptic availability of serotonin or noradrenaline have been tested as antidepressants and twenty or so have been brought to market. But none of these compounds is more successful in treating the symptoms than the ®rst drugs which were brought to market in the late 1950s. The side-effect pro®les may have improved, but the ef®cacy has not. All of the compounds produce a 50% or greater improvement in depression rating scales in about 50±60% of patients.
Coppen noted that brain noradrenaline and serotonin synthesis depend on folic acid 10 . He wondered whether antidepressants might be failing because patients were either de®cient in folic acid or had a more than normal requirement for folic acid. He therefore set up a trial in which depressed patients were all treated with¯uoxetine but then in addition were also treated with folic acid or placebo. In men there was no effect, but in women the results were dramatic. 61% of the women responded to treatment with¯uoxetine and placebo but 94% responded to¯uoxetine plus folic acid 11 . The speed of the response was signi®cantly accelerated and the side-effects were signi®cantly reduced. I think we shall see many more instances of better understanding of biochemistry leading to improved therapeutic effect.
In cystic ®brosis the genetically abnormal protein is a large transmembrane chloride channel known as CTFR. Most attempts to use this knowledge to improve treatment are based on gene therapy. But a group at Harvard wondered whether a completely different approach might workÐ changing the lipid composition of the membrane 12 . They administered a highly unsaturated fatty acid, docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) to transgenic mice with cystic ®brosis and obtained excellent results. Human trials of this approach, which is enormously more practical then gene therapy, are now underway. In Huntington's disease the problem is abnormal accumulation of a protein called huntingtin. The function is unknown but the end result is disruption of mitochondrial and neuronal membranes and neuronal death. Vaddadi wondered whether the use of polyunsaturated fatty acids might attenuate the membrane damage 13 . This hypothesis is likewise being tested clinically. V o l u m e 9 3 J u l y 2 0 0 0 complexity or clinical research, substantial parts of the pharmaceutical industry are failing to innovate at a rate which is needed for their health or for the health of the general public. Research management needs to be rethought with a much greater emphasis on creative individuals with a broad knowledge of biology and medicine, a lower emphasis on market research, and a greater openness to the information to be gained from clinical studies.
